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Abstract
A “conservation good” (such as a tropical forest) is owned by a seller who is tempted to consume (or 
cut), but a buyer benefits more from conservation. The seller prefers to conserve if the buyer is expected 
to buy, but the buyer is unwilling to pay as long as the seller conserves. This contradiction implies that the 
market for conservation cannot be efficient and conservation is likely to fail. A leasing market is inefficient 
for similar reasons and dominates the sales market if and only if the consumption value and the buyer’s pro-
tection cost are large. The theory thus explains why optimal conservation often fails and why conservation 
abroad is leased, while domestic conservation is bought.
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This paper introduces the notion of “conservation goods” and shows how they differ funda-
mentally from traditional goods in dynamic settings. Traditional goods are purchased by buyers 
who intend to consume the good: trade is typically predicted to take place immediately if the buy-
er’s consumption value is larger than the seller’s. For conservation goods, in contrast, the buyer 
is satisfied with the status quo: he does not desire to consume the good, but buys only if he fears 
that the seller will consume. This feature implies that the market for conservation goods tends 
to be inefficient. I find that the inefficiencies arise in rental markets as well as in sales markets; 
a comparison between the two generates new insight for when leasing is preferred to sales.
Tropical forests are conservation goods—in the framework of this paper. On the one hand, 
the South benefits from selling the timber and clearing the land for agriculture or oil extraction. 
On the other hand, the North prefers to have conservation in the South because tropical forests 
are among the most biodiverse areas in the world, they are inhabited by indigenous people, and 
deforestation contributes to 10–20 percent of the world’s carbon dioxide emissions, which cause 
global warming.2 Negative externalities from forest loss and degradation cost between $2 trillion 
and $4.5 trillion a year according to The Economist.3 However, deforestation could be halved at 
a cost of $21–35 billion per year (Edenhofer et al., 2014), or reduced by 20–50 percent at a price 
of $5–10/tCO2.3 (Stern, 2008; Busch et al., 2012). Given these estimates, it is puzzling why the 
North is not buying conservation on a large scale—despite having established the UN program 
REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), and that it continues 
to allow about 13 million hectares of forest to disappear every year (FAO, 2010).
Even unextracted coal and oil can be conservation goods when there are environmental ben-
efits from keeping the resources in the ground. In fact, I have elsewhere argued that a climate 
coalition may prefer to “buy coal” to ensure it is left in the ground (Harstad, 2012). Framstad and 
Harstad (2016) study the optimal contracts and Harstad and Mideksa (2016) show how they de-
pend on the political regime. The present paper can explain why we have not seen such a solution 
in reality.4
There are many other examples of “payments for environmental/ecosystem services” (PES; 
Engel et al., 2008). In the United States, The Nature Conservancy frequently uses land acqui-
sition as a tool of its conservation effort. But the outcome is often inefficient. On the Solomon 
Islands, for example, villagers had agreed with the Earth Island Institute to protect bottlenose 
dolphins in return for $2.4 million SBD (Solomon Island Dollars). When the pay was delayed, 
the villagers retaliated by slaughtering as many as 900 dolphins.5 The seller’s desire to con-
serve only because she hopes to receive payments in the future makes the good reminiscent to a 
“hostage.”6
2 The estimates have varied within this interval since IPCC (2007, see also 2013).
3 September 23, 2010, where The Economist cites a UN-backed effort, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity 
(TEEB).
4 Nevertheless, some proposals in this direction have been made. In 2007, President Rafael Correa of Ecuador launched 
an initiative to raise $3,6b to protect Yasuni National Park, one of the most biodiverse spots on earth. In 2013 the plan 
was scrapped and the Park opened to oil drilling, after less than a tenth of the requested amount had been pledged and 
less than half a percent received (Reuters, Aug. 16, 2013).
5 The Epoch Times, January 24th, 2013. Webpage: http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/solomon-island-villagers-
kill-900-dolphins-in-retaliation-339833.html. I thank Atle Guttormsen for the story.
6 Theoretically, the conservation good could indeed be real captives or hostages, but there are important differences. 
First, I assume that the buyer is satisfied with the status quo, i.e., as long as the good is conserved, even though it is 
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historical ruins, or artworks: all these goods may generate a value as long as they are conserved, 
but the agents who benefit from conservation may be in no hurry to pay.
To formalize the market for conservation, I present a dynamic model with a seller (S), 
a buyer (B), and a good (e.g., the forest). In each period, B decides whether to buy. As long 
as B has not yet bought, S has the possibility of consuming—or “cutting.” The game is a stop-
ping game which ends after sale or consumption. It is conventionally assumed that no one can 
commit to future play. The main novelty in the game is that B benefits if S conserves.
As in most games with an infinite time horizon, there are multiple subgame-perfect equi-
libria (SPEs), and some of these are efficient. However, if we restrict attention to stationary, 
Markov-perfect, or renegotiation-proof equilibria, no equilibrium in pure strategies allows for 
conservation. The buyer cannot buy with probability one, since S would then conserve and there 
would be no need to buy; a contradiction. The seller cannot cut with probability one, since B 
would then hurry to buy and S would conserve in the meantime; another contradiction. Instead, 
the natural equilibria are in mixed strategies. If the strategies were purified, the outcome would 
be that the forest gradually vanishes.
Since the sales market is inefficient, I also consider a rental market where B can temporarily 
pay S for conservation. For the same reasons as before, it cannot be an equilibrium that B rents 
with a very high probability, since S would then always conserve, making it unnecessary for B to 
rent. The inefficiencies are thus similar to the sales market. But the two markets are not identical 
and, when compared, the model predicts the rental market to be both better and the equilibrium 
choice if, for example, B faces a high protection cost. This cost is not paid by B when B rents, 
since S will then have incentives to protect the good herself.7 If conservation across borders 
requires higher protection costs, the result is that domestic conservation will be bought, while 
conservation abroad will be rented.
The buyer’s temptation to hope for the status quo interacts with free-riding incentives when 
there are multiple buyers. When the model is extended to deal with this situation, I show that 
when the number of buyers is larger, the probability that at least one buyer pays is reduced. This 
interaction means that one inefficiency can be reduced by manipulating the other. In particular, 
with a large number of potential buyers, it may be ex ante optimal to let the buyer privatize the 
good at the cost of a lower conservation value for everyone, even if this would not be optimal ex 
post or with only a single buyer.
The next section properly defines conservation goods, discusses their relationship to other 
goods, and reviews the related literature. Section 3 presents the model and analyzes the sales 
market, while Section 4 repeats the exercise for rental arrangements and compares the two mar-
kets. Although the basic model assumes a single buyer and a seller who has all the bargaining 
power, Section 5 relaxes both assumptions and discusses possible remedies. Section 6 discusses 
efficient (non-stationary) SPEs but it also derives the set of renegotiation-proof equilibria and 
shows that these are similar to the inefficient ones. Section 7 concludes and outlines a way to test 
the theory’s predictions, while Appendix A contains all proofs.
possessed by the seller. Second, I ignore how the incentive to take hostages is affected by commitment (Selten, 1988), 
reputation, or uncertainty (Lapan and Sandler, 1988).
7 Of course, protection could also be costly to the seller (see footnote 22). The results continue to hold as long as 
protection is more expensive for the buyer than for the seller. Somanathan et al. (2009) do find that regional forest 
management in the Himalayas is less expensive than is national management.
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This paper defines conservation goods in the following way: A conservation good is a good 
that generates nonexcludable benefits as long as it is not consumed.8
Conservation goods are special only if a set of conditions are satisfied. First, conservation 
goods are interesting only when there exists at least one agent (S) who values consumption more 
than conservation, while at least one other agent (B) prefers conservation. Further, the specificity 
of conservation goods becomes clear when B’s conservation benefit is larger than S’s value of 
consumption. It will also be assumed that the good is initially owned by S. If B owned the good, 
there would never be any trade under these preferences.
When B’s conservation value is higher than S’s consumption value, a price exists such that 
both players benefit from trading at this price relative to the outcome in which S consumes. Then, 
S and B have the following ranking of alternatives, respectively:
status quo ≺S consume ≺S payment
consume ≺B payment ≺B status quo
The preference of the seller, S, is standard, while the fact that the buyer, B, ranks the status quo 
higher than trade is specific to conservation goods. This ranking comes from the “nonexcludable” 
term in the definition above, which implies that is not necessary to buy and own the good in order 
to enjoy the conservation benefit. Thus, B prefers the status quo, in which S conserves the good, 
over the outcome where B must pay S for conservation.
The term “as long as” in the above definition points to the dynamics.9 In a static game, or 
in one with a finite number of stages, backward induction proves that S would consume at the 
last consumption stage. Anticipating this, B will certainly pay if he has a chance to do so be-
forehand. When the time horizon is infinite, S might be willing to conserve if she just expects 
B to pay later. Thus, anticipating a future agreement, the good may be conserved already to-
day.10 The buyer, however, will not pay if the seller conserves in any case. This logic means 
that reasonable equilibria are in mixed strategies, and that the good must be cut with positive 
probability.11 Consequently, the market for conservation is inefficient even if we abstract from 
traditional explanations of, for example, deforestation.12
8 Of course, the good may also generate benefits when consumed. There is no need to impose restrictions on the 
consumption benefit: it can be private/public, rival/nonrival, or excludable/nonexcludable.
9 Since I focus on the dynamics of conservation goods, the reader may also wonder whether there is any relationship 
to durable goods. However, durable goods normally provide excludable benefits, and the market for them is typically 
efficient unless one assumes that the willingness to pay is heterogeneous, nonlinear in the traded quantity, or privately 
known to the buyer (Coase, 1972; Bulow, 1982). None of these aspects are needed for conservation goods, which instead 
has the feature that the buyer may prefer the status quo.
10 This benefit contrasts with a frequently made argument in the environmental economics literature, namely, that the 
expectation of a future environmental policy leads to less conservation today (Kremer and Morcom, 2000) or a worse 
environment (“the green paradox”; Sinn, 2008 and 2012). The reason for the conflicting results is that in the present 
paper, the owner is (more than) fully compensated for conservation and thus benefits when the future policy arrives.
11 This mixed-strategy equilibrium differs from classic war-of-attrition models, where every player prefers that the 
opponent ends the game (Tirole, 1998:311; Muthoo, 1999:241). The literature on inspection games also finds equilibria 
in mixed strategies, but it relies on asymmetric information (Avenhaus et al., 2002).
12 Among the traditional explanations for deforestation, unclear property rights and difficulties in monitoring and en-
forcing contracts may be most important, but also corruption, electoral cycles, and multiple users/owners have been 
pointed to. (See, for example, Alston and Andersson, 2011; Angelsen, 2010, and the references therein.) More recently, 
Gjertsen et al. (2016) study resource protection and monitoring in a repeated relationship. For empirical studies of the de-
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always sharp. The good may generate rival and excludable benefits when it is consumed, but 
nonexcludable benefits if it is conserved. This combination is somewhat similar to the trade-offs 
one faces when public goods are privately provided. The literature has pointed out that private 
provision of public goods is typically inefficient because of free-riding (Mailath and Postle-
waite, 1990), private information (Gradstein, 1992), market power (Chari and Jones, 2000), or 
the need to provide the good (Ellingsen and Paltseva, 2016). A conservation good, in contrast, 
does not need to be provided, but—crucially—it can be irreversibly and privately extracted or 
consumed.13
Public goods are a special case of externalities, and the conservation value is a special case of 
consumption externalities where the negative externality outweighs the consumption benefit for 
some but not all parties. Consuming the good is also analogous to selling the good to someone 
interested in consumption rather than conservation. Sales in the presence of externalities were 
first discussed by Katz and Shapiro (1986) and later analyzed by Jehiel and Moldovanu (1995a
and 1995b). These papers present equilibria with inefficiencies and delay, but only under certain 
assumptions, such as bounded recall, a finite time horizon, and multiple buyers. Without these 
assumptions, Björnerstedt and Westermark (2009) show there will be no delay when attention is 
restricted to stationary strategies: trade occurs as soon as the seller is matched with the “right” 
buyer. This paper does not rest on the three assumptions made by Jehiel and Moldovanu. How-
ever, rather than imposing an exogenous matching between the buyer and the seller, as in the 
literature just mentioned, I follow Diamond (1971) by letting the buyer choose whether to get in 
touch with the seller.14 Assuming trade (and matching) to be voluntary is particularly reasonable 
when it comes to conservation goods, and it is quite standard in the literature on international 
environmental agreements to assume that participation; i.e., being present at the bargaining table 
is both voluntary and necessary for negotiations to proceed.15
The analysis uncovers a new drawback of leasing markets: since the market for conservation is 
inefficient, payoffs may be higher if the parties trade once and for all. This leads to novel results 
when comparing sales vs. leasing, even though I follow the finance literature when assuming that 
the seller has a lower cost of protecting or maintaining the good.16
terminants of deforestation, see Burgess et al. (2011), Damette and Delacote (2012), or, for an earlier overview, Angelsen 
and Kaimowitz (1999).
13 Thus, free-riding incentives are not necessary for the inefficiencies in the market for conservation goods: it is enough 
with a single buyer. Further, there is no private information in the analysis below. Finally, no party can exploit any market 
power and improve their terms of trade by reducing the traded quantity. This follows because there is a single indivisible 
good. With many goods and downward-sloping demand curves, Chari and Jones (2000) show that the market for clean 
air, for example, can be inefficient when the permits are complementary and the parties have market power.
14 This assumption is important: if the buyer and the seller are always and exogenously matched, the proposer will 
always ensure that the gains from trade are immediately exhausted. Jehiel and Moldovanu (1999) endogenize matching 
by allowing the seller to reach out to any (set of) buyer(s), and they show that the identity of the final buyer is independent 
of the initial owner. This is in contrast to my paper, and the explanation is, once again, that in my model the buyer can 
decide whether to get in touch with the seller. Another paper in this literature is by Jehiel et al. (1996), who let the seller 
commit to a sales mechanism.
15 See Barrett (2005) for a survey, Dixit and Olson (2000) for public good provision agreements, or Battaglini and 
Harstad (2016) for a dynamic emission game with coalition formation. In this literature, countries can free-ride simply 
by not showing up at the bargaining venue. The literature nevertheless predicts full cooperation if there are as few as two 
parties. The outcome is worse for agreements on conservation, I show, since the buyer(s) prefers the status quo.
16 As stated by Levy and Sarnat (1994:662): “under a full-service lease the lessor provides maintenance; in many cases 
he may be in a better position to provide such service.” The economics literature on sales vs. leasing focuses instead 
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3. The sales market
3.1. Stage game
There is one seller (S; “she”), one buyer (B; “he”), and one indivisible good initially owned 
by the seller. First, the buyer decides whether to buy the good. If he does, the game ends. If he 
does not buy, the seller decides whether to consume or conserve the good.
The game is quite standard, and its terminal payoffs are illustrated in Fig. 1. If the buyer 
purchases the good, he enjoys the direct benefit D although he must pay the price P , which in 
turn equals the seller’s payoff. If the buyer does not buy and the seller consumes the good, the 
seller enjoys the payoff C > 0. All parameters are common knowledge.
The main novelty in this stage game is that the buyer enjoys some benefit from the existence 
of the good, whether or not it is purchased. This “existence” value, or perhaps “environmental” 
benefit, is represented by E > 0. Payoffs are normalized such that if B does not buy and S does 
not consume, both payoffs are zero. Thus, the existence value E is experienced as a loss by B if 
and only if S consumes. A positive existence value is reasonable for all examples mentioned in 
the Introduction, but to fix ideas and point to an important example, I will refer to the good as a 
unit of forest and S’s consumption as cutting.
Quite generally, D measures the difference in utility for B between owning and having the 
good conserved by S. For a traditional good, such as the purchase of a car, D > 0 and E = 0. But 
for a “pure” conservation good, where B enjoys the full value of the good whether B buys or S 
conserves, then E > 0 and D = 0. If there is a cost of maintaining or protecting the forest, then 
B may actually prefer that S owns and conserves it: the protection cost can be measured by −D. 
Thus, D < 0 is quite reasonable when it comes to conservation goods. Section 4 allows B to pay 
S to conserve the good in a rental agreement (then, B saves the protection cost −D). The model 
can easily be reformulated to permit a maintenance cost also for the seller (see footnote 22). In 
this section, parameter D plays a minor role and the reader is free to simplify by assuming that 
D = 0.
To make the problem interesting, I will assume:
D <C <D +E.
Note that the addition of E does not alter the play of the static game: it is a unique best 
response for S to consume, given that she reaches her decision node, and (therefore) it is a unique 
on the monopolist problem (Bulow, 1982), asymmetric information (Hart and Tirole, 1988; Hendel and Lizzeri, 2002), 
moral hazard (Henderson and Ioannides, 1983; Smith and Wakeman, 1985), or the combination of these (Johnson and 
Waldman, 2010). For textbook discussions, see Tirole (1998) or Bolton and Dewatripont (2005).
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B’s strategy simply be the probability that he buys, b ∈ [0,1], while S’s strategy is the probability 
that she cuts, c ∈ [0,1], given that she reaches her decision node.
Proposition 0. Suppose there is only one period.
(i) If P <D +E, b = 1 and c = 1.
(ii) If P = D +E, b ∈ [0,1] and c = 1.
(iii) In equilibrium, S proposes the price P = D +E.
Part (i) shows that the good is conserved with probability one if the price satisfied 
P ∈ (C,D +E). The origin of the price P is actually irrelevant for the results of this paper: 
it can be exogenously given or an endogenous outcome of a bargaining game between B and S. 
To be specific, however, I henceforth assume that the exact timing of the stage game is the follow-
ing. First, the buyer decides whether to contact the seller. In contrast to the traditional literature 
(reviewed in Section 2), I do not assume that the buyer and the seller necessarily and exogenously
match. Instead, I endogenize this matching by letting the buyer make the choice of whether to 
visit the seller (as in Diamond, 1971, for example). If B does contact S, S proposes a price and 
B decides whether to accept. If indifferent, it is conventionally assumed that B accepts S’s pro-
posal. If there is no trade, S decides whether to consume. With this, part (i) of the proposition 
is only for illustration. In equilibrium, S proposes the price D + E and, anticipating this, B is 
indifferent when considering whether to contact B; any b ∈ [0,1] is therefore an optimal strategy. 
In particular, there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium in which B contacts S with probability one. 
The outcome is then first best if D > 0, but not if D < 0, since then the first best would require 
S to conserve without selling.
3.2. The dynamic sales game and equilibrium
Consider the stage game above and suppose that the game ends if the buyer buys or the seller 
cuts. If no such action is taken, the forest is conserved and the game continues to the next period 
with the identical stage game.
As before, payoffs are normalized to be zero unless the game stops. Now, the existence 
value E, for example, should be interpreted as the present discounted cost of losing the forest’s 
conservation value forever. The discount factor of player i ∈ {B,S} is δi ∈ (0,1), so if the forest 
is cut at time t , B’s present-discounted value of this cost measured at time zero is δtBE. Parameter 
C can be interpreted as the market value of the timber when the forest is cut, plus the present-
discounted value of the agricultural crops that thereafter can be grown on the land. Parameter D, 
or −D, may be interpreted as the present discounted cost to B from protecting the forest forever 
after his purchase. Parameters are assumed to be constant over time for simplicity, and the good 
is assumed to be indivisible, but both assumptions could be relaxed.
There are many subgame-perfect equilibria in this game, and some of them are efficient; see 
the discussion in Section 6. The set of stationary and Markov-perfect equilibria (MPEs) is here 
the same, since the game ends as soon as the stock size changes. There are several reasons 
for why I emphasize these equilibria below. First, some refinement is necessary to make sensi-
ble predictions. Second, MPEs are simple: in the words of Maskin and Tirole (2001:192–193), 
they “prescribe the simplest form of behavior that is consistent with rationality” while capturing 
the fact that “bygones are bygones more completely than does the concept of subgame-perfect 
equilibrium”. Third, because the strategies do not depend on the history in arbitrary ways, they 
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(payoff-irrelevant) history one should condition strategies on. Fourth, and perhaps because of 
this robustness, subjects in experiments tend to choose Markov-perfect strategies in complex 
environments (Vespa, 2012; Battaglini et al., forthcoming). Finally, the stationary equilibria are 
representative for the set of weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria (WRPs). Although WRP may 
be a more appealing refinement, I postpone that discussion to Section 6 since the set of WRPs is 
more complicated to derive and explain.
With stationarity, B’s strategy is simply his probability of contacting S, b ∈ [0,1], and the 
probability of accepting an offer from S as a function of the proposed price. S’s strategy specifies 
a price offered to B, in case B contacts S, and the probability of cutting, c ∈ [0,1], if the good 
is not sold. One can easily show that B will employ a cutoff strategy by accepting any price 
lower than some threshold, P , and S will ask for this exact price. Thus, we can summarize the 
equilibrium strategies as (b, c,P ).
If C > D + E, no trading price exists that can make trade mutually beneficial. Furthermore, 
if C ∈ (δS (D +E) ,D +E), then S would prefer to cut, given the chance, even at the highest 
price which B would be willing to pay, D +E. The set of equilibria is then as in the static game: 
(b, c,P ) = (b,1,D +E), where b ∈ [0,1]. From now on, I thus assume C < δS (D +E), which 
coincides with C <D +E when δS → 1.
Proposition 1.
(i) There is exactly one equilibrium in pure strategies:
b = 0, c = 1,P = D +E.
(ii) There are multiple equilibria in mixed strategies. For every price P ∈ [C/δS,D +E], the 
strategies (b, c,P ) constitute an equilibrium if and only if:
(iii) b = C
P−C
(
1−δS
δS
)
and c = 1 − D+E−P
E−δB(P−D) if P ∈
[
C
δS
,D +E
)
;
(iv) b ∈
[
0, C
D+E−C
(
1−δS
δS
)]
and c = 1 if P = D +E. (1)
Part (i) describes the unique equilibrium in pure strategies. It is easy to check that this indeed 
characterizes an equilibrium: When considering S’s offer, B is willing to accept P = D+E since 
S cuts for sure otherwise. At this P , however, it is a best response for B to never contact S. Since 
there is no chance for trade, S cuts. Unfortunately, there is no other equilibrium in pure strategies: 
If S cuts for sure (c = 1), she always requires exactly this price. If, then, B contacts S for sure 
(b = 1), then S would not cut—a contradiction. Similarly, c = 0 cannot be an equilibrium since 
B would then prefer to never buy, and S must prefer to cut.
Part (ii) shows that there are multiple equilibria in mixed strategies. Each equilibrium is char-
acterized by some equilibrium price, and B is indifferent when considering whether to show up 
while S is indifferent when considering to cut. Thus, if B contacts S and he anticipates the equi-
librium price P , he is indifferent between paying P and continuing the game as if he had never 
contacted S. S cannot obtain a price higher than the equilibrium P , so she proposes exactly this 
price. This explains why multiple prices are consistent with an equilibrium even if S can make 
a take-it-or-leave-it offer when proposing this period’s price. (In Section 3.3, S announces the 
equilibrium price as well as this period’s price, leading to a unique equilibrium.)
Each player randomizes such that the opponent is just indifferent and, hence, also willing to 
randomize. This explains the comparative static. Suppose P increases (i.e., compare an equilib-
rium with a large price to an equilibrium with a small price). Then, B is less tempted to buy and, 
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to be willing to randomize, S must be more likely to cut. At the same time, S becomes inclined 
to wait for the high price and thus, B must buy with a smaller probability (as in Fig. 2). For a 
given P , the seller finds cutting more attractive if the market value, C, increases or if the future 
is more discounted, in that δS decreases. To ensure that S is still willing to conserve in these 
situations, the probability for sale, b, must increase. Hence, B is more likely to buy conservation 
if the price is small and, perversely, when the market value of cutting is large! Similarly, for a 
given price, the buyer finds it less attractive to contact S if the value of conservation is low and 
protection is costly. To ensure that B is willing to buy, S must cut with a larger probability in 
these circumstances.
When we compare to the one-period version of the game, and Proposition 0, two differences 
are striking. First, if the price were strictly between the two valuations, the good would be con-
served with probability one in the static game, but not in the dynamic version. Second, when S 
proposes the price, the equilibrium price can be anywhere between the valuations in the dynamic 
game, but must equal the upper boundary in the static version.
A non-divisible good and mixed strategies are not necessary for these inefficiencies to arise. 
If there is a mass one of the conservation good, then b can be interpreted as the fraction that is 
bought every period, while c can be interpreted as the fraction that is cut.17
3.3. Payoffs, prices, and welfare
At the start of the game, the equilibrium payoff for the buyer, VB , is pinned down by the 
fact that buying is always a best response. Thus, VB = D − P . For a traditional good for which 
P ≤ D, we have learned that the buyer is willing to purchase with probability one, so that the sell-
er’s equilibrium payoff at the start of the game is VS = P . The sum of these payoffs is simply D, 
independent of P . A more interesting situation arises with conservation goods. In equilibrium, 
the seller is indifferent between cutting and waiting for her discounted equilibrium payoff, δSVS . 
Therefore,
VB = D − P ; (2)
VS = C
δS
. (3)
17 A proof for these claims is available (upon request) and it is based on a number of assumptions. Relaxing these 
assumptions must be left for future research.
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VS = C/δS − (−D) − P . When D < 0, this sum is negative and it quantifies the equilibrium 
inefficiency since the first-best sum of payoffs is simply zero (i.e., S conserves forever). Of all 
equilibria, welfare is certainly larger in the equilibria characterized by a small price. For the 
lowest possible equilibrium price, B buys with probability one. For the highest possible price, 
S cuts with probability one.
How is the equilibrium P selected? The equilibrium price is the anticipated equilibrium, 
which both S and B might take as given. Anticipating this equilibrium, I have let S propose a 
price for the current period once B contacts S. Given S’s power to propose a price, one may 
argue that it is reasonable for S to pick the equilibrium price, as well. For example, once B con-
tacts S, S may make the following statement: “You may think that the equilibrium price is P , but 
let me propose that you purchase at price P ′. Since I am willing to propose P ′ now, it is reason-
able that I will propose this P ′ tomorrow as well, and thus P ′ is the price I will consider to be 
the equilibrium price, from now on.” As long as P ′ ∈ [C/δS,D +E], B will coordinate on this 
new equilibrium if he believes that S will do so. Thus, S does not need to commit when announc-
ing such an equilibrium. After this speech, B will immediately accept, since B is indifferent to 
trading at P ′ if this is indeed the new equilibrium price. If S has such power to announce the 
equilibrium price once B contacts S, then S will certainly ask for the highest price in the feasible 
interval. Thus, S suggests P = D +E and B accepts. If the players anticipate all this, then b and 
c are given by Proposition 1 for P = D +E. To summarize:
Corollary 1.
(i) Total welfare is decreasing in P .
(ii) If S announces the equilibrium P when meeting B, then:
P = D +E ⇒
b ≤ C
D +E −C
(
1 − δS
δS
)
,
c = 1,
VB = −E,
VS = C
δS
.
If we endogenize the equilibrium price in this way, the probability for conservation is sim-
ply b, perversely increasing in the value of cutting and decreasing in the value of conservation. 
Note that, as δS → 1, b → 0, and the good is consumed always and immediately. In short, the 
sales market fails miserably.
4. The rental market
4.1. Stage game
In a leasing or rental market for conservation, player B pays player S to conserve the good 
for a given length of time. There are several reasons to analyze this market: (i) the sales market 
proved to be very inefficient; (ii) existing REDD agreements specify payments conditional on 
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may be very costly for a buyer to protect a forest that is far away; and (iv) a buyer may fear that 
the seller will attempt to renationalize the forest.
Arguments (iii) and (iv) suggest that buying may be a costly conservation method. The best 
interpretation of −D > 0 is that it may represent the present-discounted cost for B when protect-
ing the forest forever against illegal logging or S’s attempt to renationalize it. Naturally, this cost 
is not paid when B rents the forest, since S is then herself interested in protecting the forest so 
that it can also be rented in the future.
The stage game is otherwise quite similar to the one for the sales market. B first decides 
whether to contact S. If he does, then S suggests a rental price, p. If B accepts, B pays p to S and 
the good is conserved until the next period. If no rental contract is signed, S decides whether to 
consume. Consumption ends the game and gives the payoff C to S and −E to B, just as before. 
The one-period version of the rental game is thus very similar to the one-period version of the 
sales game, and the two are identical if D = 0.
4.2. The dynamic rental game and equilibrium
As a start, consider only one-period rental contracts (this is relaxed in footnote 21). So, if B 
rents, S agrees to conserve and to protect the good for one period but thereafter, the players enter 
the next period with the identical stage game. Thus, only cutting ends the game.
As before, I let b and c represent the stationary probabilities that B contacts S and that S cuts 
at her decision node. Thus, B’s strategy is simply (i) his probability of contacting S in any given 
period, b ∈ [0,1], and (ii) the threshold p for when he would accept the contract. S’ strategy is 
to offer exactly the price p if B contacts S and, at the cutting stage, it specifies the probability of 
cutting, c ∈ [0,1]. The equilibrium can be summarized by (b, c,p).
If C > E, no p can make renting mutually beneficial. If C ∈ (δS (1 − δB) / (1 − δS) ,E), 
S prefers to cut even at the highest price that B would be willing to pay, E/ (1 − δB), 
so the equilibrium is simply (b, c,p) = (b,1,E/ (1 − δB)), b ∈ [0,1]. I henceforth as-
sume C < δS (1 − δB) / (1 − δS), which coincides with C < E when discount factors are 
large.
Proposition 2.
(i) There is exactly one equilibrium in pure strategies:
b = 0, c = 1, and p/ (1 − δB) = E.
(ii) There are multiple equilibria in mixed strategies. For every p/ (1 − δB) ∈
[
C/δS,E
]
, the 
strategies (b, c,p) constitute an equilibrium if and only if:
(iii) b = C
p
(
1−δS
δS
)
and c = 1 − E(1−δB)−p
E(1−δB)−δBp if
p
1−δB ∈
[
C
δS
,E
)
;
(iv) b ∈
[
0, C
δSE
]
and c = 1 if p1−δB = E.
(4)
18 Norway’s REDD+ agreements with Brazil, Guyana, Indonesia, Tanzania and Mexico can be found online: http://
www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/md/. The United Nations’ REDD program is described here: http :/ /www.un-redd .org/.
B. Harstad / Journal of Economic Theory 166 (2016) 124–151 135The equilibrium is analogous to that of the sales market. The comparative static is similar and 
b and c, as functions of p, look pretty much like Fig. 2.
Qualitatively, Corollary 1 extends to the rental market. The seller’s payoff is simply 
C/δS . The price maximizing welfare is the smallest possible price, since, then, b = 1. How-
ever, if S can announce the equilibrium p when meeting with B, then p = (1 − δB)E, 
b ≤ C (1 − δS) /δS (1 − δB)E, and c = 1, so cutting takes place relatively fast.19
4.3. Buy or rent conservation?
In the rental market, the game never ends before S cuts, but, in the meanwhile, the seller 
is protecting the good and not the buyer. Thus, if D < 0, renting every period implements the 
first-best outcome, while a sale implies a loss. Further, a sales market exists only if E > C +
(−D), while the rental market exists whenever E >C.
To make positive predictions regarding the choice of contracts, consider first the rental mar-
ket. The buyer anticipates some equilibrium price p and the seller cannot charge a higher rent. 
However, S may benefit from proposing a sales contract instead. It is reasonable that the two will 
agree to a sale if and only if there exists some price P such that both B and S are better off by 
trading at P than by continuing to rent.
In the sales market, similarly, B anticipates some equilibrium price P . If B contacts S, B is 
unwilling to accept a higher price. Nevertheless, S might proposing a rental agreement instead, 
if both B and S are better off renting at some price p rather than trading at P .20
Proposition 3.
(i) Consider a sales market equilibrium characterized by P. There exists a rental contract which 
both B and S strictly prefer if and only if B’s protection cost is high:
(−D) > δBP −C
1 − δB . (5)
(ii) Consider a rental market equilibrium characterized by p. There is no sales contract which 
both B and S weakly prefer if and only if B’s protection cost is high:
(−D) > δBp
1 − δB −C. (6)
(iii) If S can announce the equilibrium price, conservation will be sold if and only if:
(−D) > δBE −C. (7)
19 The seller is indifferent when considering protection of the good at the cutting stage, whether or not B has rented the 
good for this period. Thus, S does not need to precommit and B’s payment does not need to be conditioned on actual 
conservation. However, if S were assumed to protect the good with the same probability whether or not the good would 
be rented, then there would be no value in a rental arrangement and B would never rent.
20 The rental contract lasts one period only, and in the following period, either (a) B may consider renting again at some 
(equilibrium) price, or (b) B and S may revert to the equilibrium in the sales market. Regardless of whether the future 
is expected to be (a) or (b), the following proposition describes the condition under which a rental contract exists which 
Pareto-dominates selling at the negotiation stage.
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Renting has an advantage if it is costly for the buyer to protect the forest after a purchase, i.e., 
if −D > 0 is sufficiently large. The model therefore predicts that conservation of areas far away 
(where protection would be costly) will be rented, while local conservation, perhaps within the 
buyer’s own country, will be bought.
Interestingly, (i) and (ii) say that a sale is more likely if the equilibrium price is large. At a 
high price, B contacts S with a small probability and S cuts with a high probability. Anticipating 
the future inefficiencies, S and B are better of trading once and for all.
If S can announce the equilibrium price when B contacts her, as in Section 3.3, (5) and (6) are 
identical and rewritten as (7). Then, when E is large, the price is high, and a sale is preferred: If 
conservation is sufficiently valuable, conservation is bought rather than rented!
Fig. 3 illustrates the parameter set under which “rent” is preferred by B and S. In the area 
“rent” (or “buy”), the rental (or sales) market is strictly better: condition (7) is illustrated as the 
dashed line. In the area “RENT” (or “BUY”), only the rental (sales) market exists. It is also 
straightforward to allow for a T -period leasing agreement,21 or for a protection cost for the seller 
as well as for the buyer.22
21 The figure is drawn for the case in which δB = δS . The dashed line is kinked at E = C/δS , since, for smaller E’s, 
which have been assumed away, we could have b = c = 1 in the rental market, and a sales contract would then be better 
if and only if D ≥ 0. Note that as δB → 1, the area where renting is preferable converges to the area “RENT,” where 
the sales market is nonexistent: as each period becomes very short, the cost of risking cutting in each of these periods 
becomes arbitrarily large. This suggests that one-period contracts are unreasonable when δB → 1. With a T -period 
leasing arrangement, (7) will be replaced by (as I show in an earlier version of this paper):
(−D) > δTB (E −C/δB) .
22 In fact, we can allow for protection costs for the seller without modifying the analysis at all, since C can be interpreted 
as the value of cutting plus the seller’s saved protection cost, if just D is interpreted as the difference in protection costs. 
To see this, let GB and GS be the present discounted protection costs for B and S, while C is the seller’s consumption 
value. With status-quo payoffs normalized to zero, S gains C + GS if she cuts. All equations for the sales market stay 
unchanged with the interpretations:
C ≡ C +GS, D ≡ GS −GB, and P ≡ P +GS,
where P is the sales price. Note that D <C follows when C > 0 and GB > 0, and D < 0 if GS <GB . The rental market 
is also unchanged. An earlier version of this paper discusses all this in detail.
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This section extends the analysis by allowing for multiple buyers and an arbitrary allocation 
of bargaining power when negotiating the price.23 Allowing for multiple sellers would not nec-
essarily change the analysis.24
Consider first the sales market. There are n > 1 identical buyers and at the beginning of each 
period, the buyers simultaneously decide whether to contact the seller. If more than one buyer 
decides to contact the seller, then each of these buyers is equally likely to be the single buyer 
who is matched with the seller. The single buyer who trades with the seller pays the cost P −D, 
while every buyer avoids the loss E. If no buyer contacts the seller, then S decides whether or 
not to cut.
When a buyer is matched with the seller, the two negotiate the price. Let now α ∈ (0,1)
measure the share of the bargaining surplus that goes to the seller. It is straightforward to pro-
vide a noncooperative bargaining game generating this outcome: For example, consider a finite 
alternating-offer bargaining game in which the seller makes the last offer with probability α. If 
discounting is negligible between the offers, then the two players will already agree after the 
first offer at some price P ∈ (C,D +E), and S indeed receives the share α of the bargaining 
surplus.25
With these modifications of the model, the equilibrium sales price becomes unique. Further-
more, the price becomes a sensible function of the other parameters in the model: the price will 
naturally increase in C and in the seller’s bargaining power α. Interestingly, the price will also 
increase in the number of buyers. Each buyer is, as before, indifferent between contacting S and 
not. When a buyer is matched with S, he is negatively surprised by the fact that no other buyer is 
matched with S instead. This loss, which is larger if n is large, adds to the buyer’s willingness to 
pay for ending the game. This willingness to pay is exploited by the seller, who can then ask for 
a higher price.
To keep the seller indifferent, the probability that some buyer contacts S, b, must be given by 
the same function as before: b = C (1 − δS) /δS (P −C). After all, when considering whether 
to cut, S is only comparing the value of cutting to the probability that a buyer will show up, 
regardless of the number of buyers. This implies that when n grows and P increases, b must fall. 
23 These two extensions are combined because they complement each other. If the n > 1 buyers had no bargaining 
power, one could show that only one buyer could be active in equilibrium. With a single buyer with positive bargaining 
power, the equilibrium price would collapse to C/δS , unless the model were extended also in other reasonable directions.
24 There are several ways of introducing multiple sellers. In line with the analysis above, one may assume that a buyer’s 
loss when multiple forests are cut is linearly separable. Thus, if a buyer purchases every forest in the set MB while every 
forest in the set MC is cut, then the buyer’s payoff would be:∑
j∈MB
(
Dj − Pj
)− ∑
j∈MC
Ej .
In this situation, whether one forest is purchased, conserved, or cut does not influence any player’s payoff when he is 
considering risking the purchase, conservation, or cutting of another forest. It follows that the game between one seller 
and the buyer(s) is strategically independent of the outcome or the play with another seller, and each of the games (one 
for each seller) can be analyzed in isolation, exactly as is done here. However, if the value of cutting depends on how 
much other sellers cut, the optimal contract becomes more complicated (Framstad and Harstad, 2016) and may depend 
on the political regime (Harstad and Mideksa, 2016).
25 Alternatively, and in an infinite bargaining game, the bargaining power index can be derived from the differences in 
δS and δB (see Muthoo, 1999:52, drawing on Binmore, 1987).
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much that even the total probability that one of the n buyers will contact S is decreasing in n.26
Proposition 4. Consider the sales or rental market with n > 1 and α ∈ (0,1). There is a unique 
symmetric equilibrium. In this equilibrium, b ∈ (0,1) and c ∈ (0,1]. The equilibrium price in-
creases in C, α, and n, but decreases in δS and, in the sales market, also in D.
Proposition 4 states (and Appendix A proves) that the same result holds in the rental market, 
except that D will then play no role. This implies, in turn, that the essence of Proposition 3
continues to hold: when comparing the two markets, there exists a threshold for D such that 
when a buyer is matched with the seller, the two will benefit from a sale rather than a one-period 
rental agreement if and only if (−D) is above a certain threshold.27
As noted already in Section 3.3, efficiency is larger if the price for conservation is low. The 
reason is that the seller’s payoff is invariant in the price, because a buyer is less likely to contact 
S when the price is high, while a low price is beneficial to the buyers. With multiple buyers, 
the buyers’ payoff declines in the price both because the buyer who is matched with the seller 
then pays more, but also because the larger P reduces b, and thus the likelihood that one of the 
other buyers will pick up the bill. Since P increases in the seller’s bargaining-power index α, 
it follows that the outcome would be more efficient if the buyer(s) had more bargaining power. 
Buyers may be able to raise their bargaining powers by investing in a reputation for being tough 
negotiators. Although the cost of such an investment would have to be taken into account in a 
careful analysis, the results above indicate that such an investment may be good for the buyers 
as well as for efficiency.
Another channel of increasing efficiency, and the buyers’ payoffs, is to raise the direct 
value D. In reality, increasing the private value D is a policy option but it may come at some 
cost. For example, allowing an investor from the rich world to set up fences to reduce the pro-
tection cost, or permitting ecotourism in tropical forests to raise the direct private value, comes 
at the risk of reducing the conservation value for everyone. If we let this aggregate harm be an 
increasing and convex function of D, defined as H (D), then the first-best solution for D is given 
by DFB ≡ arg maxD D −H (D) = H ′−1 (1). Thus, once a buyer is matched with the seller, it is 
not socially optimal to let D increase beyond DFB .
Before a buyer has contacted the seller, however, the optimal D is larger. A larger D not only 
increases the direct benefit of purchasing the good, but also reduces the price P and increases b
and bi , the probability that a buyer acts. For both reasons, it is ex ante optimal to allow for larger 
investments in the private value than in the ex post first-best outcome.28
26 There is an analogy to the “Kitty Genovese” game (Osborne, 2003, Ch. 4.8), where the likelihood that someone calls 
the police is decreasing in the number of observers to a crime. In that game, however, there is no player similar to the 
seller in my game, and thus nothing reflects the increased cutting.
27 The condition can be written as
(−D) > δB
C
(
1−δS
δS
)
/n+ (1 − b) cE
1 − δB + (1 − b) cδB −C,
where b and c are the equilibrium strategies in the rental market (an explicit solution for the D-threshold cannot be 
derived, unfortunately). In contrast to the case with a single buyer, the threshold for D does not need to be negative since 
a rental agreement allows the buyer to hope that someone else will pay in the next period.
28 The proposition holds in the sales market as well as in the rental market. In the rental market, however, the parameter 
D is above assumed to be irrelevant, so Proposition 5(ii) would hold only weakly. However, if some private value 
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∑
i Vi and VS +
∑
i Vi increase if:
(i) S’s bargaining power α ∈ (0,1) decreases, or
(ii) the private value D increases beyond the first-best level DFB = H ′−1 (1).
Other policies have ambiguous effects on payoffs and efficiency. For example, suppose that 
the buyers regulated demand or boycotted the harvest. The consequence may be a lower value 
of cutting, C. This policy clearly reduces S’s payoff, but it can also reduce the buyers’ payoff. 
The reason is that when S is less tempted to cut, every buyer concludes that S is willing to 
conserve even if the probability for sale is reduced. In equilibrium, every bj falls if C decreases, 
and this fall is utility-reducing for a buyer i who had hoped that the other buyers would pay for 
conservation. This utility loss may outweigh the benefit that a smaller C reduces the equilibrium 
price. In short, a boycott can be harmful for everyone.
6. Robustness, refinements, and renegotiation
This section returns to the basic game of Section 3 to discuss in depth the fundamental ineffi-
ciency in the sales market for conservation and how it depends on the equilibrium concept. After 
all, there are many subgame-perfect equilibria in this game. Some of them are in pure strategies 
and some are efficient in that they always lead to conservation.
Example. Suppose D +E >C/δS . We can always find an integer  > 1 such that:
δS (D +E) ≤ C < δ−1S (D +E) .
The first inequality means that S prefers cutting today to selling at price P = D+E in  periods, 
while the second inequality means that S prefers selling at price P = D + E in  − 1 periods 
to cutting. The following is thus a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies: bt = ct = 1
when t ∈ {1,1 +,1 + 2, ..}, bt = ct = 0 otherwise, the proposed price is Pt = D + E when 
t ∈ {1,1 +,1 + 2, ..}, and Pt = δtB (D +E) when there are t periods left to one of the next 
trading time in {1,1 +,1 + 2, ..}. The outcome is that B buys immediately at price D + E, 
since S will otherwise cut immediately. If S deviates by not cutting, B does not need to buy in 
the following period since it is then in the interest of S to wait for trade in  − 1 periods.
Unfortunately, the strategies in the Example are neither stationary nor Markov-perfect. 
Markov-perfect equilibria require that strategies be contingent only on “payoff-relevant” parti-
tions of histories (Maskin and Tirole, 2001). Here, the only payoff-relevant aspect to any history 
is whether or not the game has terminated.29
The equilibrium in the Example is not renegotiation proof, either. At the interim stage in pe-
riod 1 (i.e., when S is ready to cut because B did not buy), both players prefer to renegotiate 
or redefine the time (to period 2, for example). If both players can strictly benefit by simply 
(from ecotourism, for example) could be enjoyed by the buyer also in the rental market, then one could argue that 
Proposition 5(ii) would hold in a strict sense, also for the rental market.
29 The time itself is not payoff-relevant: if one player’s strategy is not contingent on time, then the other player cannot 
benefit from such contingency either. It follows that Markov-perfect equilibria must be in stationary strategies. (I here 
follow the reasoning of Maskin and Tirole, 2001:202–203, but there exist other interpretations of “Markov-perfect equi-
libria” which permit non-stationarity; see Duffie et al., 1994.)
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nerable. The rest of this section derives the set of weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria (WRPs), 
and shows that they are similar to the equilibria described in Proposition 1, before alternative 
refinements are discussed.
The history of the game is the sequence of actions so far taken.30 A strategy for a player is 
a rule which specifies a randomization over a set of possible moves after every history. A pair 
of strategies constitutes a Nash equilibrium if each player’s strategy is a best response to the 
other player’s strategy, and a subgame-perfect equilibrium if the strategies constitute a Nash 
equilibrium in every subgame. If two subgames are identical, then the next player to move and 
the set of possible moves are the same in the two subgames. The following definition is borrowed 
from Mailath and Samuelson’s (2006:134) textbook on repeated games, who draw on Farrell and 
Maskin (1989).
Definition. An SPE is weakly renegotiation proof (WRP) if the continuation payoffs for any pair 
of identical subgames are not strictly ranked.
Thus, there is no history after which both players would strictly benefit from following the 
strategies specified for another identical subgame. Let SWRP denote the set of WRPs.
If we start a new period with history h, then B’s strategy specifies b (h), the probability that B 
contacts S as a function of h. Let P (h) be the price S will propose if B contacts S after history h. 
Note that S will not randomize over several P (h)’s: since it is assumed that B accepts S’s offer 
whenever B is indifferent, S will ask for the highest price acceptable to B. For histories right 
before the cutting stage, let h0c (h) represent the history when h is followed by B not contacting S, 
and h1c (h) the history when, after h, B contacts S, S proposes P (h), and B declines. Similarly, 
let the next-period history hl+ (h), l ∈ {0,1}, be the history where hlc (h) is followed by S not 
cutting.
I will refer to as H1 the set of possible histories which include at least one period and the 
buyer is about to decide whether to contact S (i.e., the game has not yet ended). Similarly, I will 
refer to SWRP1 as the set of equilibria in S
WRP which are such that the game does not end in 
period one with probability one, and which are truncated in that the first period is omitted. I let 
(b, c,P ) ∈ SWRP1 mean that at least one element in SWRP1 specifies the strategies b (h), c (h), 
and P (h).31
Proposition 6. The following are equivalent:
(i) (b, c,P ) ∈ SWRP1 .
(ii) For every history h ∈ H1,
P (h) ∈ [C/δS,D +E] , (8)
b (h) = C
P (h)−C
(
1 − δS
δS
)
∈ (0,1] , and (9)
30 Although each decision maker is free to randomize over the two actions, the history does not include past random-
ization probabilities when there is no public randomization device.
31 Of course, an element in SWRP also specifies how B should react after any history which ends with an offer from S. 
It is not necessary to describe this part of B’s strategy here, but note that for P (h) to be part of an SPE, P (h) must be 
the largest price which B is willing to accept. Furthermore, the following proposition holds even if I have not specified 
S’s probability of cutting after a history where an offer P = P (h) has been rejected by B.
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(
hlc (h)
)
= 1 − D +E − P (h)
E − δB
(
P
(
hl+ (h)
)−D) ∈ [0,1] if P (h) > C/δS and l = 0; (10)
c
(
hlc (h)
)
≥ 1 − D +E − P (h)
E − δB
(
P
(
hl+ (h)
)−D) if P (h) = C/δS or l = 1. (11)
(iii) After every history h ∈ H1, B’s and S’s continuation values are:
VB (h) = D − P (h) and VS (h) = C/δS.
Note that there is no equilibrium in pure strategies.32 The fact that (i) implies (ii) means 
that if one restricts attention to WRPs, then, after at most one period, B and S must randomize 
in a similar way to what we have described in Proposition 1. In fact, b is the same function 
of P as before, and, if P
(
hl+ (h)
) = P (h), so is c. The main difference is that when we do 
not require the strategies to be stationary or Markov, then the price can change from period to 
period, and it can also depend on history (in arbitrary ways). The price difference over time can 
be large, but it is limited by the requirement that the right-hand side of (10) falls in [0,1]. If the 
equilibrium price in the next period depends on whether or not B contacts S (but declines S’s 
offer), then P (h0+ (h)) = P (h1+ (h)), and also the cutting probabilities c (h0c (h)) and c (h1c (h))
must differ accordingly in order to keep B indifferent both when considering to contact S and 
when considering to accept S’s offer.33
Part (iii) of the proposition states that the continuation values take the same form as before. 
Since (i)–(iii) are equivalent, the proposition also states that in any equilibrium in which B is 
always willing to buy and S is indifferent when considering to cut, i.e., when (iii) holds, the 
equilibrium must be weakly renegotiation proof and be characterized by (8)–(11).
The above definition of WRP comes from Farrell and Maskin (1989) and it is commonly 
used in the literature. The same refinement was independently suggested by Bernheim and Ray
(1989), who referred to it as “internal consistency.” These refinements are relatively weak, and 
one might argue that an equilibrium should be considered renegotiation-proof only if it is not 
dominated by other (renegotiation-proof) equilibria. With this reasoning, Farrell and Maskin 
32 As in Proposition 1, there are equilibria in which P (h) = D + E, but this requires a unique b (h) ∈ (0,1) and not 
as well any other smaller b (including 0, as in Proposition 1). For smaller b’s, S would have preferred to cut in the 
previous period, so the game would have ended already. At the opposite extreme, there is an equilibrium in which for 
every h ∈ H1, we have P (h) = C/δS , b (h) = 1, and c
(
h0c (h)
)
= 1, but then c
(
h1c (h)
)
∈ (0,1), so this equilibrium is 
not in pure strategies.
33 If the right-hand side of (10) were larger than 1 for l = 0, B would not buy and S would have cut in the previous 
period; if l = 1, B would not accept P (h) so S would had to lower the price. If the right-hand side were smaller than 
zero for l = 0, B would strictly prefer to contact S even when c = 0 and, then, S could ask for a higher price.
In the special case in which P (h) = C/δS , then equation (11) only states a lower boundary on c
(
h0c (h)
)
. If the 
inequality is strict, B strictly prefers to buy, but because P (h) = C/δS , we continue to have b (h) = 1, VS (h) = C/δS , 
and S indifferent when considering to cut in the period before.
We cannot prove that (11) binds for l = 1. A first guess may be that if the inequality is strict, S could ask for a 
higher price, since B strictly prefers to buy at price P (h) after contacting B. However, asking for a higher price leads to 
a different history than h1c (h), and after that history B might no longer prefer to pay. (For example, asking for a higher 
price could trigger a move to an equilibrium with a smaller price, if that price is rejected by B.)
Finally, note that it is implicitly assumed that c ∈ [0,1]. This restriction can be combined with (11) by writing:
c
(
hlc (h)
)
∈
⎡⎣max
⎧⎨⎩0,1 − D +E − P (h)E − δB (P (hl+ (h))−D)
⎫⎬⎭ ,1
⎤⎦ if P (h) = C/δS or l = 0.
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the continuation payoff profile is strictly Pareto-dominated by the continuation payoff profile of 
another s′ ∈ SWRP .
By comparing the WRPs described in Proposition 6, none of them appears to be dominated by 
another: at every cutting stage, S’s continuation payoff is C, so S cannot be made strictly better 
off by moving to another WRP then. Also, at the start of every next period, S’s continuation 
payoff is always C/δS , so no WRP dominates another. If we seek to rule out the inefficient 
equilibria in Proposition 6 for not being SRPs, we must do the following:
(1) Construct strategies for the very first period such that S gets a larger payoff than C/δS . 
This is possible, since, in the first period, B may buy with a probability higher than (9) without 
upsetting S’s incentive to cut beforehand (since there is no earlier period).34
(2) At the start of any later period, we must allow B and S to renegotiate to (1).
With this, every WRP with P (h) ≥ C/δS and b < 1 will be vulnerable to renegotiation.
Unfortunately, (1) and (2) are both unreasonable. The constructed equilibrium (1) is itself 
vulnerable and it would not be WRP if history did not start with the stage where B can contact S. 
If the game started with the cutting stage, every WRP would be SRP.35
More importantly, (2) requires that B and S can renegotiate at the start of the game as well as 
at the cutting stage. In other words, we must allow B and S to renegotiate even before B decides 
whether to contact S. This does not make much sense: if B can renegotiate with S, they may as 
well discuss the sales price; then, in effect, B is already in contact with S. In the game of this 
paper, it is reasonable to allow for renegotiation only before the cutting stage and, then, every 
WRP, as described in Proposition 6, is also an SRP, because S’s interim payoff cannot be larger 
than C in an WRP. The proof of Proposition 6 only relies on renegotiation right before the cutting 
stage, and it holds whether or not the players can renegotiate at any other stage in addition.
7. Conclusions
This paper introduces the notion of conservation goods and shows that they are quite different 
from traditional goods. A buyer is satisfied with the status quo and is willing to buy only if the 
seller is likely to end conservation; but the seller conserves if she believes the buyer will pay. 
Reasonable equilibria are in mixed strategies, implying that conservation ends with a positive 
probability. The model predicts that the buyers are more likely to pay for conservation if the 
seller’s market value of cutting is large, while the seller is less likely to cut if the conservation 
value is large.
34 Proposition 6 does not pin down b (0) for the first period and, when c
(
h0c (0)
)
is given by (10), B is indifferent and 
willing to buy with a probability that is larger than C (1 − δS) /δS (P (0)−C). This gives S a payoff larger than C/δS . 
Also B benefits from this renegotiation if B and S renegotiate to an equilibrium where P (0) is strictly smaller than 
the price in the WRP they are renegotiating from (this is always possible if that price is larger than C/δS ). Using the 
terminology of Bernheim and Ray (1989), this new equilibrium dominates the first and, since the converse is not true, an 
equilibrium with P (h) ≥ C/δS will be consistent only if b = 1 in the very first period.
35 In addition, if we rule out an WRP because it is dominated by another WRP with b (0) > C (1 − δS) /δS (P (h)−C), 
then this new WRP is itself not SRP unless b (0) = 1 (and, if b (0) = 1, the game would always end in the first period). 
SRPs are often criticized because the concept rules out SPEs that are defeated through renegotiation only by equilibria 
that are themselves not viable (Asheim, 1991), and because SRPs may not even exist (Bernheim and Ray, 1989). Abreu 
et al. (1993) thus develop an alternative approach to renegotiation proofness, but their concept is mainly relevant for 
symmetric games.
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propriating property rights, many countries compensate local owners for the losses. The fraction 
of valuable areas that is conserved, and the speed at which this happens, are typically empirically 
measurable. When these data are matched with the price the owner receives in compensation, it 
should be possible to test the model’s predictions.
Data on deforestation rates, the allocation of ownerships, and profits from logging is likely 
to be collected at a larger scale over the next years, since REDD is becoming an important 
tool for mitigating climate change. While a careful empirical test must await future research, it is 
interesting to note that the anecdotal evidence on REDD contracts is in line with the theory. First, 
tropical deforestation is taking place in the South despite the fact that the estimated conservation 
value is enormous, as discussed in the Introduction. Second, existing REDD contracts are similar 
to rental agreements, although this is seldom true for domestic conservation, such as national 
parks. This is exactly as predicted by the theory, if one believes that the protection cost is larger 
for areas that are further away.
The model above is rather simple, but it has proven flexible enough to be extended in a number 
of directions. Nonetheless, many questions remain open. To isolate the key feature of conserva-
tion goods, I have abstracted from private information, learning, and more complicated utility 
functions. It may be even more important, in this setting, to study the role of reputation building 
and alternative bargaining procedures. These aspects should be examined in future research so 
that we can better understand the important and puzzling nature of conservation markets.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. At the start of each period, the continuation values for B and S depends 
on the equilibrium strategies:
VB (b, c,P ) = b (D − P)+ (1 − b) [−cE + (1 − c) δBVB (b, c,P )] ;
VS (b, c,P ) = bP + (1 − b) [cC + (1 − c) δSVS (b, c,P )] .
First, note that the equilibrium price must satisfy P ∈ [C/δS,D +E]. A larger price would 
never be accepted by B, and if the price were smaller, S would cut with probability one, if given 
the chance, and B would thus accept any price smaller or equal to D +E.
Anticipating an equilibrium price P ∈ [C/δS,D +E], the game becomes a quitting game and 
B’s decision is whether to stop and get the payoff D −P or to continue. If continuation is a best 
response, it remains a best response in the subsequent periods and B’s payoff becomes:
VB (0, c,P ) = − cE1 − δB (1 − c) ≥ VB (1, c,P ) = D−P if c ≤
P −D
E − δB (P −D) (1 − δB) .
It follows that B’s best response is
b = 0 if c < P −D
E − δB (P −D) (1 − δB) ,
b ∈ [0,1] if c = P −D
E − δB (P −D) (1 − δB) , (12)
b = 1 if c > P −D
E − δB (P −D) (1 − δB) ,
where (1 − δB) (P −D)/ [E − δB (P −D)] ≤ 1 if P ≤ D +E.
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best response, it remains a best response in the following periods and S’s payoff is:
δSVS (b,0,P ) = δSbP1 − δS (1 − b) ≥ VS (b,1,P ) = C if b ≥
C
P −C
1 − δS
δS
.
It follows that S’s best response is
c = 0 if b > C
P −C
1 − δS
δS
,
c ∈ [0,1] if b = C
P −C
1 − δS
δS
, (13)
c = 1 if b < C
P −C
1 − δS
δS
,
where C (1 − δS) /δS (P −C) ∈ (0,1) if P > C/δS . Combined with (12), the equilibrium must 
satisfy:
(a) b = 1 and c ∈
[
(1−δB)(P−D)
E−δB(P−D) ,1
]
if P = C
δS
;
(b) b = C
P−C
(
1−δS
δS
)
and c = (1−δB)(P−D)
E−δB(P−D) if P ∈
(
C
δS
,D +E
)
;
(c) b ∈
[
0, C
P−C
(
1−δS
δS
)]
and c = 1 if P = D +E.
Returning to the equilibrium price, note that in row (a) c must equal the lowest value in the 
interval: any larger c would mean that B would strictly prefer to buy, and S could then charge a 
higher price without fearing that B would reject. In every other equilibrium, as described by (b) 
and (c), B is indifferent when considering to contact S and pay the expected price P . If B does 
contact S, S can therefore charge the price P , but no higher price. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1. It is thus omitted 
here, but available upon request. 
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) First, note that if E < (≤)C, there is no rental price that makes both 
players (strictly) better off than cutting, so the rental market does not exist. Thus, assume E >C.
In the sales market, VB = D −P . In the rental market, VB = −p/ (1 − δB), since renting for-
ever in every period is a best response. If B expects to revert to the sales market in the following 
period, then VB = −p + δB (D − P). In both cases, B is indifferent between renting and buying 
if:
P = p
1 − δB +D ⇔ p = (1 − δB) (P −D) . (14)
Once B has contacted S to buy, S expects the payoff P . If S accepts a one-period rental 
agreement instead, her expected payoff is p+ δSVS = p+C, so S is indifferent between trading 
and signing a rental contract if:
P = p +C ⇔ p = P −C.
(i) We can now conclude that in a sales market with equilibrium price P , both the seller and 
the buyer benefit from instead signing a rental contract if:
P −C ≤ p ≤ (1 − δB) (P −D) .
Such a price p exist if and only if P −C ≤ (1 − δB) (P −D) ⇒ −D ≥ (δBP −C)/ (1 − δB).
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from instead trading at price P if:
p +C ≤ P ≤ p
1 − δB +D.
Such a price P exist if and only if p +C ≤ p/ (1 − δB)+D ⇒ −D ≤ δBp/ (1 − δB)−C.
(iii) This part follows when substituting in for the price S would propose. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The sales market: I will first derive b and c, given P , before determin-
ing P . The seller’s problem at the cutting stage is the same as in the proof of Proposition 1, and 
her best response is given by (13), where b is the probability that at least one buyer will show 
up. With n buyers, i ∈ {1, ..., n}, b is also a function of the individual bi’s. In the symmetric 
equilibrium, the probability that no one contacts S is:
1 − b = (1 − bi)n ⇒ bi = 1 −
(
1 − C
P −C
1 − δS
δS
)1/n
.
Let V ϕB be a buyer’s continuation value at the start of a period conditioned on that this particular 
buyer is about to contact the seller with probability ϕ ∈ [0,1]. Since V ϕB = (1 − ϕ)V 0B + ϕV 1B , it 
is clear that, when bi = 0:
V 0B = V 1B ⇔ V biB = V 0B. (15)
This equivalence implies that to determine when a buyer is willing to randomize, we do not need 
to compare V 0B with V
1
B , since it is sufficient to compare V
0
B with V
bi
B . This is convenient, since it 
is easier to derive V biB than to derive V 1B . To get V
bi
B , the buyer randomizes with the equilibrium 
probability bi , implying that the probability that some buyer contacts S is simply b. Further, when 
S is contacted, the probability that S is contacted by any particular buyer is simply 1/n. Thus, 
a buyer’s continuation value is:
V
bi
B = b
(
D − P
n
)
+ (1 − b)
(
−cE + (1 − c) δBV biB
)
⇒
V
bi
B =
b
(
D−P
n
)+ (1 − b) (−cE)
1 − (1 − b) (1 − c) δB . (16)
If instead the buyer is about to contact the seller with probability zero, his continuation value 
is V 0B = (1 − bi)n−1
(
−cE + (1 − c) δBV biB
)
. From (15), the buyer is willing to randomize if 
V
bi
B = V 0B , and this implies:
b
(
D − P
n
)
+ (1 − b)
(
−cE + (1 − c) δBV biB
)
= (1 − bi)n−1
(
−cE + (1 − c) δBV biB
)
.
(17)
Note that (17) is, together with (16), pinning down c, given P and b (where b follows from P , as 
above). In the following, a buyer’s continuation value is simply referred to as VB instead of V biB , 
since V biB = V 0B = V 1B .
To determine P , note that after i has contacted S, the total bargaining surplus is:
D −C − (−cE + (1 − c) δBVB) .
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P −C = α [D −C − (−cE + (1 − c) δBVB)] .
Solving this equation for (−cE + (1 − c) δBVB) and substituting that term into (17), we get:
b
(
D − P
n
)
+ (1 − b) (−cE + (1 − c) δBVB) = (1 − bi)n−1 (−cE + (1 − c) δBVB) ⇒
 = α
(
P −D
P − (1 − α)C − αD
)
−
[
n
(1 − b)1−1/n − (1 − b)
b
]
= 0. (18)
Lemma 1 below shows that the bracket is decreasing in b, so ∂/∂b > 0. Since b = C
P−C
1−δS
δS
and the first term decreases in P and D, but increases in C and α, we can conclude that P < 0, 
pinning down a unique P . Furthermore, D < 0, C > 0, α > 0, and δS < 0. Lemma 2 below 
shows that the bracket decreases in n, so n > 0. Since differentiating (18) gives dP/dk =
−k/P , k ∈ {α,C,D,n, δS}, we can conclude that P must increase if n, α, or C increases, 
and if D or δS falls.
Lemma 1. ∂/∂b > 0.
Proof. We only need to show that 
[
(1 − b) n−1n − (1 − b)
]
/b is decreasing in b: This is relatively 
straightforward to prove and the proof is thus omitted. 
Lemma 2. n > 0.
Proof. We only need to show that n 
(
(1 − b)1− 1n − (1 − b)
)
decreases in n: This is relatively 
straightforward to prove and the proof is thus omitted. 
The rental market: This proof follows the same lines as for the sales market. As before, S is 
indifferent between cutting or not only when the probability that someone rents in a period is:
b = C
p
(
1 − δS
δS
)
⇒ bi = 1 −
(
1 − C
p
(
1 − δS
δS
))1/n
,
in the symmetric equilibrium. Buyer i is indifferent between randomizing by contacting S with 
probability bi and abstaining from this if:
b
(−p
n
)
− (1 − b) c (E + δBVB) = −
(
1 − bj
)n−1
c (E + δBVB) ⇒ (19)
b
(p
n
)
=
[
(1 − bi)n−1 − (1 − b)
]
c (E + δBVB) . (20)
To determine p, note that after i has contacted S, the total bargaining surplus is c (E + δBVB). 
S’s surplus is simply p, which is a fraction α ∈ [0,1] of the total surplus if p = αc (E + δBVB). 
Substituted into (20), we get:
 = α − 1
[
(1 − bi)n−1 − (1 − b)
]
= 0. (21)n b
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down b as a function that decreases in n and α. The price p follows from p = C
b
(
1−δS
δS
)
, so p
increases in n, α, and C, but decreases in δS . 
Proof of Proposition 5. I will prove (ii) first. We have VS = C/δS , while Vi is pinned down by 
the fact that one best response for buyer i is to contact S with probability one and expect the 
payoff:
Vi = − (P −D)ς,
in the sales market, where ς is the probability that a buyer is matched with S, conditional on this 
buyer contacting S. Clearly, ς ∈ (1/n,1), so the sum of the Vi ’s is larger than D − P . A larger 
D increases Vi directly, reduces P , and increases b, which, in turn, lowers ς . Consequently, 
∂
∑
i Vi/∂D > 1, while VS is invariant in D.
(i) A smaller α reduces P , increases b, which in turn reduces ς , and, hence, Vi increases, 
while VS is unaffected. A similar argument holds for the rental market. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Let Hc be the set histories such that S is about to decide whether to cut, 
and let UB (hc) and US (hc) be the interim continuation values for B and S after hc ∈ Hc. The 
main part is to prove that (i) implies (ii). Each lemma below is proven by contradiction.
Lemma 3. For every h ∈ H1, P (h) ≥ C/δS .
Proof. If P (h) < C/δS , S would prefer to cut at the previous cutting stage, so the game would 
already have ended, contradicting h ∈H1. 
Lemma 4. If s ∈ SWRP , then US (hc) = C∀hc ∈ Hc .
Proof. Let h+ (hc) ∈ H1 be defined as the history where, after hc, S does not cut. Let h+c (hc) ∈
Hc be the history where h+ (hc) is followed by B not contacting S. Clearly, US (hc) ≥ C, be-
cause S can cut after hc. Now, suppose US
(
h′c
)
> C for some h′c ∈ Hc . Clearly, US
(
h′c
)
> C is 
possible only if B might buy later. B is willing to by later only if S might cut after some other 
history unless B contacts S. Hence, there must be some hc ∈ Hc such that both US (hc) > C
and c
(
h+c (hc)
)
> 0 ⇒ US
(
h+c (hc)
) = C. After history h+c (hc), S is clearly strictly better off 
renegotiating to hc, and so is also B, it is easy to show: To see that also B strictly prefers to 
renegotiate to hc, note, first, that S will not cut, so c (hc) = 0, if US (hc) > C. If b
(
h+ (hc)
)
> 0, 
B is willing to buy, so, UB
(
h+c (hc)
) ≤ D − P (h+ (hc)), which, in turn, is strictly less than 
δB
[
D − P (h+ (hc))] = UB (hc), since, from Lemma 3, P (h+ (hc)) ≥ C/δS > D. If, instead, 
b
(
h+ (hc)
)= 0, B strictly prefers history hc to h+c (hc) because, when c (hc) = b (h+ (hc))= 0, 
UB (hc) = δBUB
(
h+c (hc)
)⇒ UB (hc) > UB (h+c (hc)), since B’s utility is negative. Intuitively, 
B is better off with c (hc) = 0, followed by b
(
h+ (hc) ,0
) = 0 and c (h+c (hc)) > 0, than with 
c
(
h+c (hc)
)
> 0 already now. 
Lemma 5. If s ∈ SWRP1 , then b (h) > 0∀h ∈ H1.
Proof. Suppose b (h) = 0 after some history h ∈ H1. Then, Lemma 4 implies that VS (h) =
US
(
h0c (h)
)= C, which is worth only δSC < C in the period before. Thus, S strictly prefers to 
cut in the period before, contradicting h ∈H1. 
148 B. Harstad / Journal of Economic Theory 166 (2016) 124–151It is easy to see that if B contacts S, then the players will trade. B is willing to trade if D−P ≥
UB
(
h1c (h)
)
, so S must propose P (h) ≡ maxP s.t. P ≤ D − UB
(
h1c (h)
)
. Such a P (h) must 
exist since, by Lemma 4, US
(
h1c (h)
) = C, and since, by Lemma 3, UB (h1c (h)) ≤ D − C/δS , 
we get US
(
h1c (h)
)+UB (h1c (h))≤ D −C (1/δS − 1) < D, where D is the sum of payoffs after 
trade.
With this, we know that there must be a possibility for trade after every history in H1.
Lemma 6. For every h ∈ H1, P (h) ≤ D +E.
Proof. If P (h) >D +E, B is better off not buying, contradicting Lemma 5. 
By combining Lemma 3 and Lemma 6, we can restrict attention to equilibria in which 
P (h) ∈ [C/δS,D +E]∀h ∈ H1. It is easy to check that for every such P (h), B and S are will-
ing to randomize with b and c if and only if these strategies are as given by Proposition 6. To 
derive these probabilities, I will in the following let variables with starred superscript refer to the 
right-hand sides of (8)–(11).
Lemma 7. (a) If s ∈ SWRP , then b (h) ≤ b∗ (h) for every h ∈ H1. (b) In every SPE, c
(
h0c (h)
)≤
c∗
(
h0c (h)
) for every h ∈ H1.
Proof. (a) Suppose s ∈ SWRP and that at some h ∈ H1, b (h) > b∗ (h). Then, in the previous 
period, US > C, contradicting Lemma 4.
(b) If c (h0c (h))> c∗ (h0c (h)), B would strictly prefer to contact S: this would violate part (a) 
if P (h) > C/δS ⇒ b∗ (h) < 1, but, if P (h) = C/δS ⇒ b∗ (h) = 1, it is possible that c
(
h0c (h)
)
>
c∗
(
h0c (h)
)
although, since b∗ (h) = 1, the game would end before the cutting stage. 
Lemma 8. (a) For every h ∈ H1, b (h) ≥ b∗ (h). (b) If s ∈ SWRP1 , then c
(
hlc (h)
) ≥ c∗ (hlc (h)), 
l ∈ {0,1}.
Proof. (a) Suppose b (h) < b∗ (h) for some h ∈ H1. Then, in the previous period, S would strictly 
prefer to cut, and the game would have ended already, contradicting h ∈H1.
(b) If c (h0c (h))< c∗ (h0c (h)) for some h ∈ H1, then B would prefer b (h) = 0, contradicting 
Lemma 5. If c
(
h1c (h)
)
< c∗
(
h1c (h)
)
for some h ∈ H , then B would not be willing to pay P (h)
after contacting S, which contradicts that P (h) is an equilibrium price. 
With this, we have shown that if s ∈ SWRP1 , then (8)–(11) hold for every h ∈ H1. Note that 
US (hc) = C also in the first period, so S received the same continuation payoff before every 
cutting stage, so there is no scope for renegotiation then. It is easy to find first-period strategies 
so that (8)–(11) can be a part of a WRP, simply assume that (8)–(11) hold also in the first period, 
for example. Thus, (ii) implies (i), as well.
(iii) If s ∈ SWRP , B is willing to buy and S willing to cut, so their equilibrium payoffs are 
D − P (h) and C/δS . To show that the converse is also true, note that whenever VS (h) = C/δS
for h ∈ H1, we must in the period before have had US (hc) = C. Since this holds for every 
h ∈ H1, S cannot strictly benefit from switching to any other history with the identical subgame, 
so s ∈ SWRP . 
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combining SWRP1 with any of the following first-period strategies (with history “0”). Any price 
P (0) ∈ [C,D +E] can be part of SWRP , but we must have c (̂h1 (0)) ≥ c∗ (̂h1 (0)) for B to be 
willing to pay P (0). Regarding b (0) and c
(̂
h0 (0)
)
, the following four alternatives are all WRPs:
(i) b (0) = max{1, b∗ (0)} and c (̂h0 (0))= c∗ (̂h0 (0)) ∈ [0,1] ,
for all P (0) ∈ [C,D +E] ,
(ii) b (0) = 0 and c (̂h0 (0))< c∗ (̂h0 (0)) ∈ [0,1] , if P (0) ≤ min
h∈H P (h) ,
(iii) b (0) ∈ [0, b∗ (0)) and c (̂h0 (0))= c∗ (̂h0 (0)) ∈ [0,1] , if P (0) ≤ min
h∈H P (h) ,
(iv) b (0) ∈ (b∗ (0) ,1] and c(h0c (0))= c∗ (h0c (0)) ∈ [0,1] , if P (0) ≥ max
h∈H1
P (h) .
Since (iv) allows b (0) > b∗ (0), S can at the very beginning receive a continuation value larger 
than C/δS . Thus, any WRP with P (h) > C/δS and b (h) = b∗ (0) < 1 for some h ∈ H1 can be 
dominated by some other WRP of type (iv) with a smaller price and b (0) > b∗ (0). However, if 
this b (0) < 1, it is itself not SRP! If b (0) = 1, the game would have ended immediately, so the 
new equilibrium is not in SWRP1 . Furthermore, using (iv) to dominate the other WRPs require 
B and S to renegotiate at the start of a period, while the proof of Proposition 6 only relies on 
renegotiation right before the cutting stage.
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